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11.  Introduction
Recently there has been renewed interest in the reasons and effects of foreign aid.
The work of Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (1997), and Alesina and Dollar
(1998) analyses foreign aid flows for a large number of years and countries and
tests a number of hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of aid, the allocation of
aid between different recipient countries, the motives for giving aid, etc.  These
papers’ results provide answers to the many questions that have been put forward in
the extensive literature on the economics of foreign aid.
Research on political explanations of foreign aid has centered either on the
international political interests of the donor government (defense, political
influence, etc.) or on the domestic political behavior of the recipient government
(democracy vs. dictatorship, fungibility of aid, corruption, etc.).  The above-
mentioned authors examine in detail whether the data can identify these kinds of
political-economy relationships.  What has not been addressed in the literature,
however, is the question of domestic politics of the donor country in determining
foreign aid flows.  Given the recent proliferation of political-economy explanations
for a country’s economic policy choices (see Rodrik (1995) for a comprehensive
survey and Dixit (1996) for a convincing justification for this approach ), it seems
most relevant to examine the domestic politics of foreign aid determination.  The
objective of this paper is to draw attention to the political process in the donor
country as a pivotal force in deciding whether to give foreign aid.1
In motivating our interest in finding political economy explanations for
foreign aid, it is worth recalling what we already know from the literature on
international income transfers (see Kemp (1992) for a survey).  A well-established
result is that in a two-country world the donor of foreign aid becomes worse off if
markets are undistorted and stable.  Hence, a country that chooses its economic
policies with the objective of maximizing social welfare would never wish to
become a foreign-aid donor.  The natural question raised then is how can one
explain foreign aid flows?
1 Similar issues are addressed in Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1999).  There, however, the
main point of interest is the allocation of aid between recipient countries and how it is
influenced by lobbying activities of  minority groups.
2The answer offered by the trade literature focuses entirely on the existence
of distortions: given that markets face a number of distortions (domestic or
international, static or dynamic, endogenous or exogenous), it is not unlikely that a
transfer of income from one country to another will create indirect benefits to the
donor country that are larger than the initial direct losses.  Donor governments are
assumed to be aware of the size of these indirect (perhaps long-term) gains and,
given that they maximize social welfare, it might be optimal for them to provide
some positive amount of foreign aid.  In this sense, the thrust of the argument is
based on standard second-best intuition.2
A different type of explanation for the existence of foreign aid flows is
usually suggested by development economists.  Foreign aid is given because donor
countries are (and should be) altruistic.  This strand of the literature focuses on
showing that donor countries in reality help less than what they think they do.  This
argument is based on the negative welfare effects that conditionality rules impose
or on the adverse behavioral changes that aid leads to (either by reducing the
savings ratio or by inducing delays in necessary political and economic reforms);
see, e.g., Cassen (1988).  However, and returning to the question posed above,
giving aid is nothing else than the outcome of a donor’s country’s social preference.
The present paper puts forward a quite different explanation of foreign aid
giving, namely that it is the outcome of the donor country’s domestic political
process.  Foreign aid, as any actual economic policy choice, is determined through
a political process in which all participants pursue their self-interest rather than
through the objective of maximizing a country’s overall welfare.  The political
process can result in foreign aid giving if at least some people benefit from the
country’s role as a donor.  If the beneficiaries from foreign aid giving are also
decisive for the choice of economic policies, then the country becomes a donor.  At
issue, therefore, is whether the giving of aid to foreign residents can benefit some
segments of the domestic population and whether the political process enables these
winners to impose their will on the rest of society.
The main idea of this paper is developed in a standard two-country, two-
good, two-factor framework in which political decisions on foreign aid are made
2 This intuition can also be applied to the so-called three-agent transfer problem, as
3through majority voting.  Individuals have different factor endowments and,
therefore, different interests in economic policies.  Foreign aid is financed through
a proportional income tax that is already in place.  Foreign aid, therefore, reduces
every person’s income and this direct effect of foreign aid makes every person
worse off.  There exist, however, important indirect effects as well.  When foreign
aid leads to a terms of trade change, individuals are affected both as consumers and
recipients of factor income.  If each individual owned exactly the same amount of
factors of production, then the standard transfer payment result would prevail,
namely that the direct effect is always stronger than the indirect effects and each
person of the donor country becomes worse off.  If, on the other hand, the
distribution of factor ownership is unequal, then the indirect effects of foreign aid
might not only have a positive impact on a person’s welfare but be sufficiently
strong to more than offset the negative impact of the direct effect.  Hence, some
people might actually gain from the country’s giving of foreign aid.  In a direct
democracy with majority voting, the median voter’s preferences are decisive for the
policy choice.3  If the median voter gains from the giving of aid, the country
becomes a donor of foreign aid, even though social welfare declines as a result of
the aid payment.4,5
It generally is the case that poor recipient countries have a higher marginal
propensity to consume certain goods, such as food or weapons, than rich donor
countries.  Hence, a transfer would raise the world prices of these goods.
discussed in Bhagwati et. al. (1983).
3 We employ the direct-democracy, majority-voting model primarily for reasons of
convenience; it is the simplest political economy model with completely specified economic
and political markets (Rodrik, 1995).  Foreign aid giving can even more easily come about
in a more realistic, but also more complex, representative democracy model with interest
groups. The cost of containing free-rider problems works to the advantage of forming
smaller groups with concentrated benefits.  An industry with relatively few voters, such as
agriculture in the United States, might easily succeed in promoting foreign aid that benefits
few and hurts many.
4 The recipient country as a whole will always benefit from aid in this model.  The situation
where foreign aid is not accepted by the recipient country, as a result of its own political
choice, is not considered in this paper.
5 In principle, the mechanism described here can be generalized to domestic distributional
transfers.  In the case of domestic transfers, the costs of transferring income from one group
of society to another are smaller than the costs of foreign aid, since income stays always
within the country.  Differences in marginal propensities to consume between donors and
recipients, on the other hand – which is the driving force behind price changes – tend to be
larger when transfers are international.
4Individuals in the donor country whose factors of production are intensively used in
the production of these goods (farmers in the agricultural sector or capital owners in
the high-tech defense industry) have incentives to vote for foreign aid, as the
Stolper-Samuelson effect comes into play.  At the same time the incomes of people
with factors that are used intensively in other sectors
will fall.  Thus, while all factor owners pay a proportional income tax to finance
foreign aid, the factor owners benefiting from the price-wage effect are able to
achieve extra gains at the cost of factor owners that are losing from the price-wage
effect.
2.  Model6
Consider a two-country, two-commodity world in which the people of Home decide
through majority voting whether to give aid to Foreign which, in turn, is willing to
accept any amount of offered aid.  Each country has fixed endowments with capital
and labor, and each country produces both commodities using these factors.
Industry production functions are subject to constant returns to scale, factors are
perfectly mobile between industries, and all markets are perfectly competitive.
Within Home, the ith person’s ownership of labor and capital, respectively, is
described by:
[ ])(),( iKiL . (1)
We explicitly assume that every person owns one unit of labor, such that L(i) = 1,
and that 0 < K(i) < K(I), where K(I) is the endowment of the capital-richest person.
Preferences of factor-owning individuals are assumed to be homothetic and
identical within a given country, but different between countries.  Hence, aggregate
demand of a country is independent of the distribution of income and depends on
the country’s total income only, and the two countries have different marginal
propensities to consume at given prices.  The ith person’s indirect utility function in
Home is:
6 The general structure of the income distribution model is based on Mayer (1984).
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where p is the price of good two in terms of good one and I(i) is spendable income
of individual i.  Income of individual i, in turn, is given by:
[ ][ ]tirKwiI −+= 1)()( , (3)
where w and r are the returns on labor and capital respectively, and t is the
proportional income tax rate.  All people face the same factor returns, are subject to
the same tax rate, and own the same amount of labor; their incomes differ from
each other solely due to differences in capital ownership.  The tax rate is set in a
way to finance the chosen foreign aid payment, T:
)( rKwLtT += , (4)
where L and K denote Home’s total endowment with labor (which also equals the
number of people) and capital, respectively.  Using (4), one can restate the ith
person’s income of (3) as:
IiiI )()( φ= , (5)
where φ(i) = [w + rK(i)]/[wL + rK] is the ith person’s share of total factor income
earned and I = [wL + rK – T] is spendable income for the entire country.  Noting
that total factor income earned equals the country’s value of goods produced, we
can write:
TppXpXTpII −+== )()(),( 21 , (6)
where Xj indicates Home’s total production of commodity j = 1,2.
In order to restate the ith person’s income share expression, we first define
ρ = w/r as Home’s wage-rental ratio.  In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, ρ = ρ(p) and
6ρp(p) = dρ/dp, the Stolper-Samuelson derivative, is positive (negative) if the second
good is labor (capital) intensive in production.  Then:
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A person’s income share is directly related to her capital ownership; but it also
depends on the price of the second good.  Differentiating the above expression with
respect to p yields:
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where k = K/L is Home’s aggregate capital-labor endowment ratio or, stated
differently for our purposes, the average person’s capital-labor ownership ratio.
Noting that K(i) is the ith person’s capital-labor ownership ratio, (8) states that a
price increase of the second commodity raises a person’s income share if the person
owns relatively more than the average person of the factor that is employed
intensively in the production of the second good.  For example, if person i is
relatively capital-rich, such that K(i) > k, and the second good is capital intensive,
ρp(p) < 0, then the ith person’s income share rises with a price increase of the
second good.
There are no impediments to trade, and there are no domestic production or
consumption taxes.  Consequently, prices faced by consumers and producers are the
same in both countries.  For a given amount of transfers, the relative price of the
second good is determined through the balance of trade equation:
TTpMTppM −= ),(),( *12 , (9)
where M2(p,T) = C2(p,I) – X2(p) is import demand for good two by Home, M1
*(p,T)
= C1
*(p,I*) – X1
*(p) is import demand for the first good by Foreign, Cj denotes a
country’s aggregate consumption of good j, I was defined by (6), and an asterisk
7indicates that the variable belongs to Foreign.  Differentiating (9) with respect to T
yields the terms-of-trade effect of a transfer payment:
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where m2
* = p(∂C2*/∂I*) and m2 = p(∂C2/∂I) are the marginal propensity to consume
good two in Foreign and Home, respectively; ε = -(p/M2)(∂M2/∂p) > 0 and ε* =
[p/(M1
* - T)][∂M1*/∂p] > 0 are the two countries’ respective uncompensated import
elasticities of demand.  To assure stability of the world exchange system, the sum
of the import elasticities of demand must exceed one; i.e. ε + ε* - 1 > 0.  Thus, in
line with the literature, a transfer from Home to Foreign increases the second
good’s price if Foreign’s propensity to consume the second good exceeds Home’s.
3.  Individually Optimal Aid Payments
Moving on to the political choice of foreign aid, we first focus on how much aid is
best for a given individual.  Each person realizes that a foreign aid payment affects
her welfare, as expressed in (2), in three different ways: First, each person has to
pay higher taxes to finance the aid.  Second, each person faces a different price as a
consumer whenever the transfer leads to a terms-of-trade effect.  Third, each person
receives a different amount of factor income in response to the terms-of-trade
effect.  Given the feasible set of aid payments, 0 < T < X1(p) + pX2(p), and
assuming that U(i) = U{p(T),φ[p(T),K(i)]I[p(T),T)]} is strictly concave in T, person
i will favor some positive level of foreign aid if
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when evaluated at T = 0.  Using Roy’s identity and the homotheticity of
preferences assumption, we substitute -[ ] [ ])(/(.)//(.) iIUpU ∂∂∂∂ = c2 =
φ(i)C2(i), as well as ∂I/∂p = X2(p) and ∂I/∂T = -1, to rewrite this condition for
favoring some form of foreign aid as:
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The bracketed term inside the braces must always be negative, as is well known
from the traditional literature on the transfer problem (the direct plus indirect
welfare effect of a transfer on the country as a whole is always negative).  Hence, a
necessary condition for a foreign aid payment to lead to an increase in the welfare
of a person in the donor country is that the transfer raises the income share of this
person, as expressed by the second term inside the brace.  Considering equations
(8) and (10), such an increase in the ith person’s income share will occur if
Foreign’s propensity to consume exceeds Home’s for that good which uses the
factor relatively intensively of which person i owns relatively more than the
average person.  Specifically, the ith person’s income share will rise if her capital
ownership ratio exceeds (falls short of) that of the average person and Foreign has a
higher propensity to consume the capital (labor)-intensive good than Home.
Provided (11) is satisfied for person i, this person will have a positive most
preferred level of foreign aid, denoted by T(i), at which
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Given a person exists for whom T(i) > 0, the question arises whether we
can say anything about the optimal amount of aid of other people, with different
capital ownership.  In order to establish such a relationship between a person’s
individually optimal foreign aid level and her capital ownership, let us note first
that only the second term in (12) depends on the value of K(i). If the second term
rises with K(i), then people with higher K(i) values want to give more foreign aid
and people with lower K(i) values want to give less foreign aid.  After substitution
of (8) into this second term, differentiation with respect to K(i) yields:
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The first term on the right-hand side of (13) is positive, as it is the necessary
condition for the individual’s optimality of giving any aid (see (11)).  The sign of
the second term depends on whether the individual owns more or less capital than
the average person in the country.
Returning to the individual optimality condition for foreign aid, as
presented in (12), we can thus see that the second, positive term in (12) rises with
K(i) if the person who favors some positive level of foreign aid owns more capital
than the average person, but it declines with K(i) if the person who favors some
positive level of foreign aid owns less capital than the average person.
First, let us consider the case of K(i) >  k. Using (8), this means that the
second term in (12) can be positive only if the price of the capital-intensive good
goes up in response to the transfer; that is, ρp(p)[dp/dT] < 0.  Hence, person i is
capital-rich and benefits from a transfer that raises the price of the capital-intensive
good.  Equation (13) then states that, for K(i) > k, there exists a direct relationship
between a person’s capital ownership and the percentage gain in her income share
from a transfer that raises the price of the capital-intensive good.  This means that
for any person n with capital ownership K(n) > K(i), the second term of (12) is
larger than for person i, implying  that the nth person’s individually optimal
transfer, T(n), also exceeds that of person i, T(i). It also means that there exists
some K(h) < K(i) such that person h is indifferent between paying the transfer and
not paying.  Person h is the marginal supporter of foreign aid; all people with
higher capital ownership support a positive amount of aid, whereby the amount is
increasing with the amount of capital owned, and all people with lower capital
ownership prefer no aid payments at all.  This relationship is expressed in Figure 1,
where the critical assumption is that the transfer raises the price of the capital-
intensive commodity.
Figure 1: (about here)
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Second, let us consider the case of K(i) < k.  Figure 2 illustrates the
corresponding relationship between individually optimal transfer payment and a
person’s capital ownership when the good whose price rises in response to the
transfer is labor intensive, meaning that ρp(p)[dp/dT] > 0. In this case, the second
term in (12) is positive because person i is capital poor.  Equation (13), in turn,
states that the value of this second term of (12) rises with a decline in  capital
ownership.  Accordingly, individuals without capital ownership favor the highest
amount of foreign aid.  As capital ownership rises up to K(h) < k, the individually
optimal amount of aid declines until it reaches zero for the marginal aid giver,
person h.  All people with more capital than person h will always favor zero aid.
Figure 2:  (about here)
So far we have established that, if there exists a person in whose interest it
is to give foreign aid, then foreign aid will also be desired by all other people with
more capital ownership if the aid payment raises the price of the capital-intensive
good and by all people with less capital ownership if the aid payment raises the
price of the labor-intensive good.  Hence, we have to show that it is at least possible
that there are some people for whom equation (12) holds at some positive value of
T(i) or, stated differently, that the inequality of equation (11) holds when evaluated
at T = 0.
With this objective in mind, we write each of the terms inside the brace of
(11) explicitly.  Denoting the income-compensated import elasticities of demand
by:
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and realizing that ε = e + m2 and ε* = e* + m1
*, one can show that the first term
inside the brace can be expressed as:
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The second term inside the brace of (11), in turn, can be stated as:
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where ω =ρp(p)p/ρ(p) expresses the percentage change in the wage-rental ratio in
response to a percentage change in the second good’s price; its absolute value must
exceed one, due to the magnification effect in the Stolper-Samuelson relationship,
and it is positive for a labor-intensive and negative for a capital-intensive second
good.
Comparing the magnitudes of (14), which represents the welfare effect of a
transfer to the average person of the country, and (15), which represents the
redistribution of income effect due to a transfer, we make the following
observations about the possibility that the latter outweighs the former.  First,
necessary conditions for (15) to be positive are that donor and recipient country
have different propensities to consume and that person i is different from the
average capital owner; person i must be relatively capital-rich when aid raises the
capital-intensive good’s price and relatively capital-poor when aid raises the labor-
intensive good’s price.  Second, a person’s redistribution of income effect becomes
larger relative to the average welfare effect the more her capital ownership differs,
in either direction from that of the average person and the greater the differences
between the two countries’ propensities to consume.  Third, for sufficiently unequal
distributions of capital ownership and sufficiently large differences in propensities
to consume there exists a person i for whom the redistribution effect outweighs the
average welfare effect, evaluated at T = 0.
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4.  Political Choice of Aid through Majority Voting
Having examined the individual person’s preferences for foreign aid, we next
consider the political process through which individual policy preferences are
transformed into a country’s chosen policy.  For convenience sake, we assume that
foreign aid policy is determined in a direct democracy through majority voting.7
Within the feasible set of aid payments, T > 0, each person casts a vote that reflect
her self-interest.  Under majority voting, a political equilibrium level of foreign aid
is established when it is not possible to assemble a majority of voters to change this
aid level.  Given our assumptions of foreign aid being the only issue under
consideration and of each voter having a unique individually optimal level of aid
giving, the political aid choice under majority voting is determined by the median
voter’s most preferred level of aid, denoted by T(m).  Provided T(m) > 0, majority-
determined foreign aid will be positive even though it is not in the interest of the
average inhabitant of this country to give foreign aid.
Figures 1 and 2 show monotonic relationships between individuals’ factor
ownership and foreign aid preferences.  Accordingly, for a given distribution of
capital ownership, as described by F(κ), with density function f(κ) for 0 < κ < K(I),
the median owner of capital, κ(m) also becomes the median voter on foreign aid,
whereby κ(m) is determined by the condition:
2
1
)(
)(
0
=∫ κκ dFm . (16)
If the distribution of capital ownership is symmetric, then capital ownership of
median voter and average capital owner is exactly the same, such that κ(m) = k.
Since the average capital owner will never want her country to become a donor of
foreign aid, a necessary condition for the political process to yield a positive
amount of aid payments is that the distribution of capital ownership is skewed,
either to the right or to the left.
7 Note that the policy choice in a representative democracy could be the same as in a direct
democracy provided perfectly competitive political markets prevail (see Hillman (1989)).
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When the distribution of capital ownership is such that the majority of
individuals owns more capital than the country’s average capital owner, then κ(m)
> k and the possibility emerges that majority voting will lead to foreign aid giving
provided this aid’s indirect effect is to raise the price of the capital-intensive good.
Recalling the earlier stated identification of capital ownership of the marginal aid
giver, K(h), there will be foreign aid giving if κ(m) > K(h).
The likelihood of actual political choice of aid by capital-rich people is
rather small, given the real-world distributions of factor ownership rarely, if ever,
show a majority of capital rich individuals.  Does this, therefore, make the political
argument behind foreign aid giving something that is technically possible but in
reality not occurring?  The answer is in the negative for at least three reasons.  First,
most political systems do not permit all factor owners to vote, as was assumed
above.  Importantly, voter eligibility rules tend to fall most heavily on individuals
who do not possess much capital, such as migrant workers, teenage workers,
inmates of prisons, recent legal and illegal immigrants, and so on.  If one looked at
the capital ownership distribution of eligible voters only, it becomes far more likely
that one will encounter one with a majority of capital-rich people in the real world.
Second, our analysis assumed that every person whose welfare is affected by the
foreign payment, through paying the tax and factor return changes, will actually
vote and that there are no costs of participation in the political process.  In other
words, there is no free rider problem among voters and the participation costs are
negligible.  Both these assumptions are quite strong, however.  If, more
realistically, one assumed that the probability of voting is a function of the net
benefit or net loss from a proposed policy choice, then the actual voters’ factor
ownership profile might become quite different from that of the population as a
whole.  It is quite possible that capital-rich people will become a majority of actual
voters.  Third, it is entirely possible that the policy is dictated by capital-poor rather
than by capital-rich people.  If a country has a majority of capital-poor people, the
median voter’s capital ownership will be less than that of the average factor owner;
that is, κ(m) < k.  Provided the foreign aid payment results in a price increase of the
labor-intensive good, the possibility emerges that capital-poor people vote in favor
of foreign aid payments, as can be seen from Figure 2.  The median voter’s capital
14
ownership is to the left of k.  If κ(m) is also less than capital ownership of the
marginal supporter of foreign aid, such that κ(m) < K(h), then the capital-poor
majority of voters in Home will indeed vote in favor of aid to Foreign.
5.  Concluding Remarks
This paper formulated a political economy model of endogenous foreign aid
determination and proposed it as a new explanation for foreign aid giving.  It is an
explanation that is complementary to the existing approaches on this issue, i.e. the
second-best approach of trade theory and the altruism approach of development
economics.  The political economy approach to aid giving is important since in
reality the adoption of all economic policies is critically affected by domestic
policy considerations.
The key behind the political explanation of foreign aid is that aid giving
affects the international terms of trade which, in turn, changes the distribution of
income among factor owners in the donor country.  The income distribution effects
of aid giving will be significant if there are sizable differences in propensities to
consume between donor and recipient country and the domestic distribution of
factor ownership is quite unequal.  It is likely that at least some people will benefit
from aid giving if these conditions prevail.  Should the beneficiaries from aid
giving also be decisive in choosing economic policies, the political choice of the
donor country will be to give foreign aid.
We formulated a political economy model of foreign aid under the
assumption that the distribution of income effects are determined in a standard
Heckscher-Ohlin model and that foreign aid policy is adopted through majority
voting in a direct democracy.  Our choice of economic and political models was
motivated by a desire to formulate a specification of endogenous aid policy
formation that is both complete and easily tractable.  The underlying implications
from our simple model, however, carry over to more realistic, though less tractable
descriptions of the political process as well.  In fact, political choice of foreign aid
is even more likely to come about in a representative democracy with interest
groups.
There exists a huge literature on the endogenous choice of trade policies in
the presence of interest groups, as surveyed in Hillman (1989), Rodrik (1995), and
15
Helpman (1995).  Groups of individuals with common interests, such as people
with the same factor ownership, try to influence economic policies by offering
financial contributions or information to politicians or competing parties during
elections or to the government currently in power.  Given such an alternative
political process, one can show that a relatively small group of people with
common interests can easily succeed in shaping foreign aid policy that benefits the
small group and hurts the vast majority of the population.  For example, the
farming industry might succeed in promoting a foreign aid policy that substantially
raises demand for its products, benefiting farmers but hurting everyone else.
A small interest group might succeed in setting a donor country’s aid
policy preferences because the benefits from aid might be very concentrated while
the losses are widely dispersed (see Baldwin (1982) and Hillman (1989) among
others).  Even though the country suffers a net loss in the aggregate, the per capita
gains of the few beneficiaries might be vastly larger than the per capita losses of the
many losers.  This inequality in magnitude of individual welfare effects can be seen
in equation (11) of our model as well.  The average decline in welfare due to aid
giving is adjusted by a change in the ith person’s income share.  When foreign aid
benefits one industry only, the large gains in income shares by few gainers is
accompanied by very small income share losses of many losers, as the sum of all
income share changes must be zero.  Given this situation, the large number of
losers might have far less of an incentive to form a foreign aid-opposing interest
group than the few aid-supporting gainers.  Interest group formation is not without
costs.  Importantly, there are the costs of containing the free-rider problem and
these costs tend to rise with the size of the group, not just in total but also per
capita.  Accordingly, the many losers from giving foreign aid might not even form
an interest group to oppose the influence-seeking by a given industry.  The few
gainers, with higher per capita gains and lower per capita organizing costs, will
form an interest group and influence policymakers through contributions and
information conveyance.  Accordingly, an industry that represents a small part of
the entire voting public succeeds in directing a country’s foreign policy towards
giving aid.
16
References
Alesina, A. and D. Dollar, 1998, Who gives foreign aid to whom and why, NBER
working paper no. 6612, Cambridge, MA.
Baldwin, R.E., 1982, The political economy of protectionism, in: J.N. Bhagwati,
ed., Import Competition and Response (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago), 263-86.
Bhagwati, J.N., R. Brecher and T. Hatta, 1983, The generalized theory of transfers
and welfare: bilateral transfers in a multilateral world, American
Economic Review 73, 57-76.
Boone, P., 1996, Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid, European Economic
Review 40, 289-330.
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar, 1997, Aid, policies, and growth, Policy Research
Working Paper no. 1777, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Cassen, R. 1988, Does aid work?, Clareton Press, Oxford.
Dixit, A., 1996, The making of economic policy: a transaction-cost politics
perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Helpman, E., 1995, Politics and trade policy, NBER working paper no 5309,
Cambridge, MA.
Hillman, A.L., 1989, The political economy of protection, Harwood Academic
Publishers, Chur.
Kemp, M.C., 1992, The static welfare economics of foreign aid: a consolidation, in:
Savoie, D. and I. Brecher, eds., Equity and efficiency in economic
development: essays in honor of Benjamin Higgins (McGill-Queens
University Press, Montreal) 289-314.
Lahiri, S. and P. Raimondos-Møller, 1998, Lobbying by ethnic groups and aid
allocation, EPRU WP 99-05, University of Copenhagen.
Mayer, W., 1984, Endogenous tariff formation, American Economic Review 74,
970-85.
Rodrik, D., 1995, Political economy of trade policy, in: G. Grossman and K.
Rogoff, eds., Handbook in International Economics, Vol 3, North Holland,
Amsterdam.
17
  T(i)
K(i)
O         k K(h)         K(I)
Figure 1: Individually optimal aid as a function of capital ownership when
price of the capital-intensive good rises.
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Figure 2: Individually optimal aid as a function of capital ownership when
price of the labor-intensive good rises.
